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globalization: Micro-level evidence from China 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a micro-level framework to account for how firms in developing economies 
overcome domestic institutional constraints. It illustrates that the mechanisms enabling those firms to 
benefit from financial globalization are more complex than the “direct” financial channels outlined in 
the neo-classical approach. China provides an important example in this context, as its capital market 
liberalization has been limited and neither the legal nor financial system is well developed. Yet micro-
level evidence from China’s internationally listed enterprises indicates that innovative firms can 
overcome institutional thresholds, secure access to international capital, and benefit and learn from 
international capital markets. This can in turn induce market-level improvements through regulatory 
competition and demands for a more standardized system of economic regulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of how developing economies can improve the benefits derived from financial 
globalization has dominated recent discourses on global integration. The standard neo-classical 
approach argues that long-term financial flows from capital-rich to capital-poor countries generate 
welfare gains for both sets of countries. However these “direct” benefits have proved difficult to 
quantify and a recent revision has argued that countries first need to reach a threshold of institutional 
development before they can benefit from financial globalization (Kose et al, 2007). Similarly, the 
literature on corporate governance has mainly focused on the relationship between corporate 
governance and institutions, and in particular on how the quality of legal institutions determines the 
system of governance (La Porta et al, 2000). It suggests that in order to facilitate capital market 
development, emerging economies should converge towards governance systems that offer strong 
legal protection for investors. Yet, in developing economies, the institutions that underpin capital 
market development are either absent or at an early stage of development. China is a case in point. Its 
recent economic growth has been achieved in the absence of a well-developed law and financial 
system. The puzzle is deepened by the history of financial development, which shows that laissez faire 
was more the exception than the norm (Supple, 1976). This paper examines how developing 
economies can improve the benefits from financial globalization, when the institutional thresholds 
deemed necessary for convergence are not met. 
Distinguishing itself from the macro-level approach, this paper focuses on the micro-level 
innovations that enable firms in developing economies to overcome institutional constraints to better 
governance practices, increasing their benefits from financial globalization. It explores how firms can 
use international listing to bond themselves to better governance practices, thereby enabling them to 
successfully access international financial markets. Drawing on the experiences of China’s 
internationally listed enterprises that have implicitly used financial globalization to access 
international finance, and the evolution of the Anglo American system of corporate governance, it 
argues that the mechanisms that enable firms in developing economies to benefit from financial 
globalization are not necessarily the “direct” channels outlined in the neo-classical approach. It 
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follows that the long term benefits may not be easily captured empirically in the direct financial 
benefits, but rather the less obvious “collateral” benefits.  
Often viewed as relics of central planning, China’s state enterprises are somewhat unlikely 
beneficiaries of financial globalization. Many operate in near monopoly conditions and retain strong 
ties to the state bureaucracy. Capital controls insulate domestic stock markets from the volatility often 
associated with international capital flows. These protections, along with a shortage of alternative 
investment channels and the novelty of share ownership, have meant that domestic share valuations 
remain high by international standards, and firms face a high opportunity cost in seeking finance on 
international capital markets.1 Yet, an increasing number of state enterprises have used international 
listing as a mechanism to access international capital markets. This has allowed them to draw not just 
on international finance, but also to learn from and integrate international best practices. The result is a 
type of globalization in reverse. Firms benefit from the oversight of international capital markets, even 
though the capital controls and other barriers that shield domestic markets from the direct effects of 
financial globalization remain in place.  
The paper takes a political-economy perspective by examining the variety of ways in which 
firms can use international listings as a means to increase benefits and reduce risk in the process of 
financial globalization. First, the theoretical framework outlined in Section two describes how 
historically; weak legal and regulatory institutions did not necessarily impede the emergence of 
financial markets. Integrating the micro level into the traditional financial globalization framework 
allows the identification of the significant firm-level efforts to overcome these obstacles. Applying this 
framework, Section three draws on case study evidence to illustrate the firm-level restructuring, 
monitoring and learning induced by international capital markets. Section four reviews the systematic 
evidence at both the national and international levels. Section five outlines how micro-level 
improvements have induced market-level reform through regulatory competition and a more 
standardized system of regulation. Section six concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The literatures on globalization and corporate governance raise an interesting question, 
namely how, if at all, do developing countries benefit from financial globalization? China provides an 
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important example in this context. Although there is little doubt that China has benefited from 
international trade, its growth does not necessarily fit with standard theory (Allen at al, 2005). China’s 
industrial capacity and economic growth were achieved behind high barriers (Wade, 2004). Much of 
the reductions in poverty occurred during agricultural de-collectivization, rather than during the 
subsequent trade-opening phase (Ravallion, 2006). The Asian Financial Crisis illustrated the 
vulnerability of China to financial crashes and the fragility of China’s financial institutions (Nolan, 
2004).2 In addition, political liberalization in favor of democracy and the rule of law has been limited. 
It would therefore be natural to assume that China does not meet the institutional thresholds deemed 
necessary to benefit from financial globalization. Yet, studies of China’s internationally listed 
enterprises, regarded as China’s leading corporations, suggest that it is not a necessary condition to 
reach the institutional thresholds in order to benefit from the international capital markets (Sun and 
Tobin, 2005). Nolan (2001) suggests that although China’s large enterprises still lag their international 
counterparts in terms of managerial competencies, they are actively engaging in, and adapting to 
international product markets. The following section outlines the limitations of the macro perspective 
for China. Secondly, a historical perspective on the evolution of the Anglo-American system of 
governance suggests that some answers to the question of how developing economies use financial 
globalization can be found by examining micro-level innovations.  
(a) Macro level perspectives 
The persistent efforts to address the puzzle of how developing economies benefit from 
financial globalization have led to a revised analytical framework that analyses the “traditional” or 
direct benefits alongside the “collateral” or indirect benefits (Kose et al, 2006, 2007; Mishkin 2006) 
(see Figure 1). The revised framework acknowledges the relevance of traditional direct benefits, but in 
the absence of conclusive empirical evidence also argues that financial globalization can act as a 
catalyst for certain collateral or indirect benefits. The indirect benefits of globalization include 
financial market development, institutional development, better governance practices and 
macroeconomic discipline. Attaining these benefits is however conditional on countries reaching a 
series of thresholds in financial development, institutional quality and governance standards. 
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Moreover “collateral” benefits often occur over the long-term and are not so easily captured 
empirically by standard models of financial development.   
(Figure 1 about here) 
For developing economies a difficulty with this approach is that attaining these thresholds 
involved a process of institutional evolution that took richer countries many decades, if not centuries 
to achieve. One of the most pressing problems facing developing economies is that of institution 
building (Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2004). Stiglitz (2000) points out that achieving financial market 
stability, even for a large developed economy, poses a significant challenge. For developing 
economies the challenge is magnified as the forces thought to promote governance convergence, 
including the presence of institutional investors, internationalization of markets, and competitive 
incentives, are largely absent. Even if a country succeeds in transplanting the developed market 
institutions, it would still have to deal with such obstacles as informational asymmetries and lack of 
enforcement experience (Pistor et al., 2000). Experience suggests that the institutions developed in 
richer countries do not always translate well to poorer countries; instead good institutions need to be 
home grown (Mishkin, 2006).  
(b) A historical perspective on financial globalization 
Although China’s recent economic growth is often viewed as unique, the economic logic 
underpinning such policies as international listing is not that unlike the institutional innovations that 
underpinned the evolution of the Anglo-American system of governance. Although the neo-classical 
approach to development suggests that countries should engage in capital account liberalization in 
order to benefit from globalization, a second approach suggests that economic development and 
growth are often achieved through unorthodox institutional innovations that depart from the standard 
rulebook (Rodrik, 2001). A relevant example is the emergence of the Anglo-American system of 
corporate governance. The US corporate system, often regarded as the guardian of small investors, 
developed under a protectionist trade policy. The historical evolution of the Anglo-American system 
casts doubt upon the thesis that the US corporate form, with strong managers and dispersed 
shareholders is a “path dependent” political artifact (Cheffins, 2000).  
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Mishkin (2006) dates the first age of financial globalization to the late 19th century. True, the 
19th century witnessed the emergence of London as a preferred market for securities, and it attracted 
international listings from the US and France (Michie, 1987). However economic history indicates that 
large economies benefited from the so-called “collateral” effects of globalization long before this. 
From the 17th century onwards, financial globalization aided the development of what is now regarded 
as the Anglo-American system of best corporate practice (Michie, 1987; Neal, 1978; Schubert, 1988). 
Coffee (2001, 2002) further indicates that at various stages in their history both the UK and US used 
micro-level innovations to become leading centers of international finance. These included borrowing 
financial techniques, self-regulation, and regulatory competition between stock exchanges.  
(c) A firm-level perspective of financial globalization 
Economic history and recent developments in China suggest that focusing on firm-level 
innovations can contribute to our understanding of financial globalization. One explanation for the 
difficulties of empirical studies on financial liberalization is the inadequacy of the macro-lens 
(Ravallion, 2006). In practice financial development not only occurs over a long time period, but in 
many cases stems from micro-level innovations (Glaeser et al., 2004). Coffee (2001) casts doubt on 
the direction of the causation between legal systems and corporate governance that underpins much of 
the law and finance literature. Others such as Clay and Wright (2005) have demonstrated the ability of 
agents to organize economic activity in the absence of legal protections. 
Accounting for the historical evolution of the Anglo American system of governance and 
recent preferences for international listing in China, our approach suggests that much can be learnt 
about financial globalization by focusing on the firm level. This is confirmed by studies of corporate 
governance practices across developing economies, which reveal a large variation in governance 
standards, which cannot necessarily be explained by the quality and efficiency of a country’s legal 
institutions (Pistor et al, 2000; Klapper and Love, 2004; CLSA, 2004).  Table 1 reports the relevant 
findings in CLSA (2004). It shows a significant variation in corporate governance practices, not only 
across different Asian countries, but also within these countries. Average company scores tend to vary 
in terms of country scores. Country scores measure such issues as rules and regulations, enforcement, 
political and regulatory culture. Company scores also vary considerably in terms of upper and lower 
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quartiles. Developing economies such as the Philippines, India, China and Indonesia show a marked 
variation between the governance practices of companies in the upper and lower quartiles. In fact the 
governance practices of top quartile companies in these countries are similar to those of the more 
developed countries in the region. Even in more developed market economies such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore, there still exists a variation in governance practices although these tend to be lower than in 
developing economies. This indicates that the relationship between governance institutions and firm-
level practice may be less clear-cut than is assumed by legal and political perspectives. In the absence 
of reaching institutional thresholds, many firms have already achieved the standard of corporate 
governance that would enable them benefit from financial globalization.   
(Table 1, Figure 2 and Table 2 about here) 
To account for the variations outlined above, the framework outlined by Kose et al. (2006, 
2007) can be further modified by adding a firm level (see Figure 2). At the firm level, innovative firms 
that are willing to bond themselves and commit to higher standards of governance can overcome the 
barrier of institutional thresholds. By using intermediary mechanisms to by-pass threshold conditions, 
firms have the potential to benefit from both direct and collateral benefits of globalization. Direct 
benefits include finance, the standardization of property relations and better financial performance. 
Collateral benefits include regulatory competition, improved disclosure and transparency, better long-
term access to capital and technology, organizational learning, and knowledge assimilation.  
Whereas the macro-level approach views improvements as immediate once the threshold 
conditions are met, the micro level approach views such improvements as a consequence of longer-
term commitments to better practices. There is certain inevitability in the macro-level approach, as 
good institutions lead to better performance with little said about how good institutions are developed. 
From the micro perspective, the intuition is that better institutions will follow micro-level innovations. 
Overtime, collateral benefits should spill over into the domestic economy thereby influencing the 
development of domestic institutions, driving further reform over the long term. For example, 
international listings should lead to the transfer of better business practices to the domestic economy 
and induce regulatory competition between stock markets. This incremental view of financial 
globalization is more consistent with the historical perspective on financial development, which 
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suggests that legal and political institutions tended to confirm what had already been decided in the 
market place.3 Compared to the neo-classical approach, the benefits of financial globalization are 
achieved in reverse, and over a longer period.   
(d) Financial globalization in China’s large SOEs 
The histories of financial development in the US and UK underscore the importance of 
incremental innovations at the firm and institutional level. These facilitated the borrowing of 
international financial techniques, the raising of large amounts of capital and ultimately led to the 
formation of the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. In a similar manner, China’s large 
enterprises have attempted to overcome weak domestic institutional structures by drawing on 
international capital markets, particularly Hong Kong (Table 2). From 1993 onward some 100 Chinese 
enterprises (mainly sate-owned, i.e., SOEs) have listed foreign or H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx). A further 52 subsidiaries of Chinese enterprises (mainly SOEs) have incorporated 
in Hong Kong and been listed as “red chips”. The first group of SOEs listing overseas did so at a 
crucial time. China had no securities law, the CSRC was barely in existence and the central 
government was the only authority that could sanction international listings. Although Hong Kong 
represented the major destination for Chinese listings, the global appeal of international listing is 
illustrated in statistics from the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (HKSFC), which show 
that between July to November 2005, 32 mainland enterprises (H-shares and red-chips) were 
simultaneously traded in Hong Kong, the US and UK.4 For these companies, 79% of the total trading 
value took place in Hong Kong, with 7.5% and 14% taking place in the UK and US respectively, 
further underscoring the importance of the Hong Kong market as a destination of choice for Chinese 
listings.   
The attractiveness of the Hong Kong market is underpinned by strong practical benefits. 
Schenk (2007) points out the long history of financial relations between Hong Kong and the Mainland. 
These relations predated the foundation of the PRC and survived the nationalization of China’s 
financial system during the 1950s and the radical Cultural Revolution of 1966-76. For the Mainland, 
Hong Kong offers access not just to finance and a wider investor base, but also the opportunity to 
integrate better corporate governance standards and gain greater international visibility. For Chinese 
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firms, Hong Kong’s position as a center of finance and its proximity and affinity to the Mainland give 
it considerable competitive advantages over competing stock exchanges in London and New York. 
Hong Kong’s non-prudential regulatory approach is arguably much more conducive to Mainland 
enterprises, than the more arduous prudential supervision of the New York market. Nevertheless, just 
in the same manner that leading US firms gravitated towards more developed capital markets and 
bound themselves to high standards of governance at the end of the 19th century, leading Chinese firms 
have shown a remarkable willingness to list on the Hong Kong market and comply with the high 
standards demanded. This is consistent with the findings of Pagano et al (2002) who show that firms 
from countries with weaker shareholder protection are more eager in seeking foreign listings.   
Just as financial globalization can create problems for developing countries, it can also create 
firm-level mismatches. Weak property rights and jurisdictional issues can limit cross-border 
monitoring by international institutions. The task of protecting shareholder's rights in overseas listed 
firms that have the bulk of their assets in Mainland China is made more complicated by difficulties in 
establishing the rights of competing claimants. This is particularly problematic in Mainland 
subsidiaries where property rights are less well defined.5 Orders against the reporting of certain cases 
mitigate the effectiveness of improved disclosure. 6  International Listing also creates specific 
challenges for bureaucratic styled management. There is an inherent misalignment between the 
traditional “political skills” of SOE management and the expectations of international investors. 
Reforms created ambiguities as to how former bureaucrats were to behave under market conditions 
and how they could be trained to do so (Hsu, 1991). There is also a large political cost to financial 
globalization. China’s internationally listed enterprises are ultimately subject to the political control of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Threats to this control or the revelation of corruption carry an 
implicit political cost. However, regardless of the costs associated with financial globalization, the 
CCP appears to have recognized that at the firm level there is little option but to reform.  
3. THE FIRM LEVEL BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL LISTING 
One of the most significant aspects of foreign capital is that it carries a much greater 
obligation to repay. In the Chinese context, although many international listings were capital-raising 
events, capital was often not the primary concern. Much more important was the range of 
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commitments and opportunities that were attached to international capital. Moreover, focusing on the 
direct financial benefits does not conclusively answer the question of why firms access international 
capital markets. Drawing on the firm-level framework outlined in Figure 2, this section explores the 
micro level and its relationship to financial globalization. Focusing first on the direct financial benefits, 
it points out that there is an implicit opportunity cost to using international capital markets. This cost is 
however mitigated, if not completely diminished, by the improvements in governance, organizational 
learning, and the knowledge and technological transfers that accompany international listing.  
To illustrate how this occurs in practice, we first draw on case studies of firms in three 
centrally regulated sectors: banking, telecommunications and petrochemicals. The enterprises 
examined include the Bank of China (Hong Kong) (BoCHK), which, as the first international listing of 
a subsidiary of a state-owned commercial bank, represented a pioneering banking reform. In the 
telecoms sector, the international listings of China Unicom and China Mobile marked a significant 
departure for what was previously a political and militarily strategic industry. In the petrochemical 
sector the international listings of Shanghai Petrochemical Company (SPC), one of the first SOEs to 
list abroad, and its parent Sinopec, represented a major reform for a sector once regarded as a model of 
Maoist production. As enterprises that previously formed the backbone of central planning, the 
selected cases were somewhat unlikely participants, let alone beneficiaries of financial globalization. 
Yet, in each case international listing was used to achieve outcomes that are typically associated with 
reaching institutional thresholds of legal and regulatory development. 
From a methodological perspective case studies are particularly suited to identifying micro-
level changes as they have apparent advantages where qualitative data prevail and there are more 
variables than data points. Case study data include formal semi structured interviews with enterprise 
directors and regulatory agencies, in addition to published data. A potential disadvantage is the 
question of how representative the cases are. The cases we selected are representative of their 
respective sectors and centrally regulated sectors generally. China Mobile and China Unicom are 
dominant players in the telecom sector and each accounting for more than 40% of the market. Sinopec 
is the largest player in the petrochemical sector and controls about 51% of China’s refining capacity 
(Kamabara and Howe, 2007). Bank of China (BoC) is the second largest bank in China with a market 
 10
Discussion Paper 89
Centre for Financial and Management Studies
share of more than 17% and BoCHK is the largest spun-off subsidiary of BoC (Sun and Tobin, 2005). 
To address the generalization issue, we also provide survey type evidence at both the national and 
international levels in section four.     
(a) The direct financial benefits 
The traditional view of globalization typically emphasizes the potential financial benefits for 
developing economies (Figure 1). While international listing has undoubtedly been successful in terms 
of the volume of capital raised (Table 2), the overall financial benefits are not conclusive. Enterprises 
listing in Hong Kong faced a large opportunity cost relative to listing on Mainland stock markets. 
Better share price performance, higher valuations, and cheaper finance without the transaction costs 
associated with international listing, could have been achieved using domestic capital markets. 
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, enterprises listed on Mainland markets traded at much 
higher multiples (cf. Figure 3). In 2000 the Price Earnings ratio for the Shanghai Index stood at 59 
times earnings compared to an earnings ratio of nine times for H-share Index in Hong Kong. The 
“China Enterprises Index” in Figure 3 illustrates how Chinese enterprises listed in Hong Kong were 
originally valued less than their counterparts in Hong Kong and Shanghai. These valuations have since 
converged with the Hong Kong market generally, not least because of their strong role on the Hong 
Kong market. Similarly, since 2003, an oversupply of poor quality shares on the Shanghai market has 
seen valuations decline towards Hong Kong levels. Although the opportunity cost of raising finance 
has declined in recently, the implication is that the finance motive should not be treated as 
conclusive.7   
A second direct effect of financial globalization is its effect on performance. The intuition 
underpinning privatization generally is that the social functions of SOEs are replaced with the 
objective of profit maximization. Domestic privatizations in China have typically been hampered by 
the problems of related party transactions and asset stripping (Green, 2004). In theory international 
listing provides a more credible means of monitoring management (Sun and Tobin, 2005). In practice, 
the post-privatization performance of China’s internationally listed enterprises suggests few quick 
benefits from using international capital markets (Table 3). Declining average financial performance 
with increasing standard deviation suggest that the direct benefits of financial globalization are not 
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immediately obvious, except for a few leading firms.8 Enterprises appear to have achieved pre-IPO 
improvements in preparation for international listing. However, similar to other studies on 
privatization, in many cases these improvements have hardly been maintained over the longer-term.9   
(Figure 3 and Table 3 about here) 
(b) International capital markets and external monitoring 
The high opportunity cost of international listing and the limited improvements in financial 
performance suggest that from the perspective of the firm, the rationales underpinning international 
listings are more complex than capital-based explanations. This view is confirmed at firm level. For 
firms, capital markets offered a means of devolving the supervision of enterprise reforms to external 
institutions. The BoCHK cites important business and self-regulatory considerations underpinning the 
decision to pursue an international flotation.10 From a business perspective the bank had the objective 
of transforming a loosely aligned business, consisting of 12 separate banks, into a structure that was 
capable of competing with other Hong Kong banks. A second and arguably more significant reason is 
that it would force the bank to adopt a more appropriate form of governance by subjecting itself to 
external market discipline. Inertia and bureaucratic resistance often frustrated previous attempts at 
reform. With international listing, the pressure comes from an external source. A crucial issue cited by 
the bank, was that the main emphasis of the IPO was on restructuring rather than raising equity. The 
bank gained no additional funds from the IPO. Interestingly an executive at the bank noted “when a 
firm has the maximization of funding as its prime reason for listing, there is an incentive to conceal 
issues…for the BoCHK, improving corporate governance was an objective so coming clean was very 
important.”11 By putting governance reform to the fore of its floatation, the Bank effectively subjected 
itself to more rigorous disclosure practices.  
Similar motivations are evident in the other sectors examined. An executive at Unicom, 
China’s second largest telecoms provider noted “from an overall perspective, (with domestic listing) 
you would not have incremental value and exposure to standards as with international IPO.” 12 In this 
regard international capital markets are important, not so much for raising capital, but rather the range 
of commitments and learning that come with it. A deputy director at Sinopec, China’s largest 
petrochemical refiner summed up the process by noting that while the role of the WTO is to speed up 
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economic reforms, “the purpose of listing is to reform the management of SOEs.”13 Prior to listing, 
production units were simply obliged to report production indices and profits to the state. International 
listing meant that profits now had to be reported to shareholders. It also came with a commitment to 
reduce costs and become more transparent. Sinopec committed to cut 100,000 workers from its 
510,000 strong workforce and reduce costs by US$1.6 billion.14   
The above suggests that international listing formed part of a general long-term reform effort 
to subject enterprises to international corporate practices. Even before China’s enterprises listed on 
international stock markets, most large international companies already had some sort of business 
dealings in China. This is important as it indications that the purpose of international listings was to 
bring China’s large enterprises to the attention of the international investment community. Sinopec 
acknowledged that international listing represented a progression of political efforts to improve SOE 
performance. “The government wanted its enterprises to engage in international capital markets as it 
gave them more exposure to international business practices.”15 In terms of capital, foreign investors 
became shareholders rather than revenue sharing partners. This is not to say that foreign investors did 
not play an important function. Unicom noted that the global mix of investors has created a type of 
dynamism within the firm that has forced management to do better. Preparation for listing induces 
enterprises to become more efficient and external market monitoring ensures that this efficiency is 
maintained. 
(c) Improvements in disclosure and transparency 
Although the retention of controlling shares by the state meant that the role of foreign 
investors was somewhat limited, international capital markets did provide an important source of 
external monitoring through the due diligence process. Although the HKEx is highly regarded, it is not 
a prudential regulator. Both the HKEx and the HKSFC rely to a large extent on the integrity of the 
due-diligence process.16 The due-diligence process makes it much more difficult to hide off-balance 
sheet commitments and guarantees to related parties. Significantly, despite the concern over related 
party transactions between Hong Kong listed enterprises and their mainland parent companies, 
securities regulators in Hong Kong reported that listed state enterprises from China were no more 
problematic than other classes of company listed on the Hong Kong market.17 In fact their property 
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rights structures were much more straightforward than the more complicated Asian family business 
structure, which the Hong Kong market has traditionally financed. 
How the due diligence process worked in practice is clearly illustrated in the international 
flotation of the BoCHK in 2002. Due diligence of the bank’s operations brought into the public 
domain significant information regarding the operation of a bank generally regarded as plagued by 
high information asymmetries. Preparation for listing forced a house clearing of third world practices 
generally, with the revelation of a range of irregularities both abroad and within the Bank’s domestic 
operations.18 The diligence associated with listing was not a once off event. The aftermath of the IPO 
led to further revelation of wrongdoing. In June 2003, the bank’s Chief Executive, Mr Liu Jinbao, 
resigned from his position and returned to Beijing as part of a “routine” transfer. Later it emerged that 
Liu had approved a loan to a disgraced Shanghai property tycoon. In August 2004, two of the banks 
Deputy Chief Executives were suspended and transferred to Beijing. This time, the offence involved 
the alleged unauthorized distribution for personal benefit of funds belonging to the controlling 
shareholder of the former constituent banks.19  
Although these events created certain jurisdictional issues, the overall effect was to send a 
clear signal that corruption and mal-practice were incompatible with international capital markets.  
Moreover the monitoring effect of international markets is much more consistent. The effect of 
external monitoring imposed by international capital markets is best summed up in the statement that 
“before listing you could do all kinds, regulation was not stringent. Now you can’t just do it your way. 
Listed companies also have an expectation to perform.”20
(d) Technology transfer 
An important feature of China’s large industrial enterprises is the high level of technical 
competence and their ability to source technology abroad. This would suggest that financial 
globalization was unnecessary for technology transfer. In the telecom and oil sectors, the level of 
internal technical competence does not appear to have been a significant constraint. Most executives at 
China Mobile and Unicom had long backgrounds in engineering or local postal and telegraph 
administrations. Management at Sinopec was comprised of engineers with vast industrial experience.21 
It had also developed its own “good technology” for drilling and exploration.22 The interest in China 
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shown by multi-national oil and telecoms companies meant that modern technology could be easily 
purchased, and was not a central motivation for listing abroad. In the telecoms sector the willingness 
of foreign firms to sell network technology gave China significant choice over what type of network to 
adopt. In the oil sector China began importing refining technology from the West as early as the 1960s 
(Williams, 1975). Therefore long before listing, large foreign oil companies had some business 
dealings in China.  
 International capital markets did however offer a mechanism to access proprietary technology 
through improved reputation. For SOEs with ambitions to compete internationally, quality has become 
a key issue. New technologies are often proprietary and harder to develop domestically. Firstly, 
international listings provided management with the autonomy and incentives to engage international 
partners. Secondly, it improved their international reputation. Unicom expressed the view that the 
international IPO process is interlinked with technology transfer. Although technology can be 
relatively purchased easily, entering an international partnership offers access to a much more 
sustainable source of new and proprietary technology. A company with an international listing is 
likely to have a better international reputation and is therefore less likely to engage in potentially 
damaging intellectual property disputes. 
In the petrochemical sector, similar motivations existed. Much of the technology upon which 
the sector was founded originated from the former Soviet Union and was now dated. Management also 
faced the challenge of substituting labor with modern technology. When Sinopec listed in 2000, it was 
already achieving refining yields of over 90 percent. With high levels of capacity utilization and yields, 
there was limited scope to increase capacity internally. The challenge was to build new capacity.23 
This is not so easy to achieve domestically. Chemical refining has become more technical, as refiners 
not only have to deal with low quality domestic inputs, but are also expected to produce to a higher 
standard, in order to compete with international products. As early as the 1970s, Sinopec imported 
refining equipment and technology from ABB, an international company specializing in ethylene 
purification technology. ABB later agreed to invest US$100 million in Sinopec’s IPO.24 Such leading 
international exploration and refining companies as Exxon Mobil, BP and Shell all took strategic 
shareholdings in the company’s IPO. While Sinopec cited strategic investors as important for inspiring 
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investor confidence in its IPO, there is also reason to believe that they needed these companies for 
strategic alliances. Refining technology tends to be proprietary and Sinopec acknowledged that for 
technology on the chemical side it was necessary to engage in international joint ventures.25 As part of 
its IPO, Sinopec appeared unusually willing to grant incentives in order to encourage strategic 
investors. It negotiated a deal with Exxon Mobil allowing it access to a joint venture in gasoline 
stations.26 Exxon possessed important proprietary hydrocarbon technologies. 
(e) Organizational learning and knowledge 
China’s large enterprises have used international listings to facilitate learning and knowledge 
assimilation in order to overcome deficits in managerial competencies. Conceptually, learning is 
reflected in an enhancement of organizational competencies, which should overtime reduce the risk of 
organizational mortality (Levinthal, 1991). Related to the concept of learning is that of knowledge. 
Amsden (2001) distinguishes between asymmetries of information and knowledge. From the 
perspective of transaction cost economics, financial globalization holds the prospect of reducing 
informational asymmetries. This however says little about the contribution of a firm’s knowledge-
based resources. The conceptual nature of knowledge implies that its presence will largely depend on 
firm-specific qualities. Like information, knowledge may also be imperfect, the implication being 
variations in productivity across sectors (Amsden, 2001).  
Organizational learning and the assimilation of knowledge has been an implicit feature of 
international listing. The policy of listing smaller subsidiaries first known as “marrying the prettiest 
daughter first” has allowed enterprises to draw on the experiences of earlier listings. The listing of the 
BoCHK was viewed by many as a market test for the listing of its parent company the BoC, and the 
more problematic state commercial banks. After the listing of BoCHK, the BoC was restructured into 
a shareholding company, carried out an overhaul of top management structures,27 and was listed on 
the HKEx in 2006. Following the experiences of BoCHK, the BOC recruited directors with 
international banking and regulatory experience. It also appointed directors from the BoCHK to its 
board in advance of listing. This allowed the BoC to draw on the knowledge and experiences gained 
from the listing of BoCHK. An often-overlooked feature of this approach is that it provides a 
promotion mechanism to reward the learning of enterprise management. The listing of the better 
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performing provincial mobile licenses first in China’s telecoms sector was indicative of a similar 
approach.  
The petrochemical sector provides a specific example of how learning and knowledge 
assimilation occur. The listing of SPC in 1993 provided its parent company Sinopec with some 
valuable lessons on the functioning of international capital markets. If compared to other state 
enterprises that listed in the same year such as Tsingtao Brewery (110 times oversubscribed) and 
Guangzhou Shipyard (77 times oversubscribed), SPC at 1.2 times subscribed failed to make an impact 
in terms of investor demand.28 When Sinopec listed in 2000, management had much greater market 
experience to draw upon. In the first instance they were able to draw on the directors involved in the 
listing of SPC.29 In 1994, Wang Jiming, the chairman who oversaw SPC’s public listing was made 
deputy general manager at Sinopec. Based on past experiences, Sinopec placed considerable emphasis 
on restructuring its operations to bring them in line with international management practices. The poor 
reception that SPC received taught management that an integrated structure was easier to sell to 
investors as it reduced overlapping functions and competition between subsidiaries. Integrating 
upstream and downstream operations also allowed Sinopec to absorb price increases on the input side, 
thus lessening its exposure to international price variations.30   
In the banking sector the emphasis has been very much on using foreign directors as an 
important source of introducing international banking practices. For the BoCHK international directors 
represented an important source of knowledge, or “a shoulder to lean on” for the “Beijing” directors.31 
Since 2004 it has been bank policy to involve independent directors in the recruitment of senior 
management.32 Independent directors have become an integral part of the operation of the bank. Prior 
to their appointment, no one at the bank would have considered having meetings through English or 
providing translations. They have made life much easier for the “Beijing” directors, most of who are 
executives at the BoC, as they now have someone to turn to for advice, further enhancing learning and 
knowledge assimilation within the organization.  
4. SYSTEMATIC EVIDENCE ON GOVERNANCE 
The case studies provide micro-level evidence of how firms in centrally regulated sectors 
benefit from financial globalization. However given the uncertainties surrounding the direct 
 17
International listing as a means to mobilize the benefits of financial globalization: 
Micro-level evidence from China
SOAS | University of London
“financial” benefits, it is difficult to articulate how, if at all, these micro-level innovations are leading 
to a systematic and quantifiable improvement. In fact the micro-level analysis suggests that 
improvements should be most obvious in the area of governance. To establish if this is the case, this 
section examines how international listing has led to a quantifiable improvement in general 
governance practices vis-à-vis domestic listed firms using credit ratings and survey evidence. These 
two sets of comparison indicate that the crucial difference lies between international and domestic 
listing.   
In developed economies company ratings mainly provide a comparable measure of a firm’s 
reputation and creditworthiness, given the limited measurable variations across firms in corporate 
governance structures and practices (Black, 2001). In contrast, in a developing economy like China, 
rating agents typically pay much more attention to corporate governance concerns due to the fact that 
the low quality of average governance practices in the economy leaves huge room for inter-firm 
variation. For example, of the seven firm-specific risk factors in the XFN-Far East China Credit 
Rating’s criteria, four deal with corporate governance concerns, which include management quality, 
organization structure, relationship with parent company, major shareholders and government, and 
disclosure practices.33 As ratings are based on international criteria, they therefore provide a useful 
proxy for measuring the extent to which international listing has enabled China’s SOEs to achieve 
internationally comparable levels of governance practice. XFN-Far East China Credit Rating provides 
comprehensive and reputable company credit ratings for China (The Economist, 24/05/2003). Poon 
and Chan (2007) present robust econometric evidence to show that this agency’s rating does have 
information content and influences investment decisions. XFN ratings are instructive for our purpose 
in two ways. First, they show how internationally listed state enterprise have achieved intentionally 
comparable standards of governance. Secondly they illustrate a robust disparity of creditworthiness 
between the sample of internationally listed companies and that of domestically listed.  
Table 4 reports a summary of the XFN-Far East China Credit Ratings on August 2007. Of 152 
internationally listed companies, 36 (23.8%) were qualified for the PI rating (i.e. based on publicly 
available information). In contrast, of 1434 domestically listed companies, 164 (11.4%) were qualified 
for the PI rating. Of the 36 internationally listed companies with the credit ratings, 61.1% (22 
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companies) achieved rating of A- or above. The corresponding figure for domestically listed peers is 
28.6% (47 companies). Table 4 also shows that the numbers of domestically listed enterprises figure 
much less prominently in the highest ratings. None of the domestically listed enterprises achieved the 
top rating of AAA and only one achieved AA+. In sharp contrast, four internationally listed companies 
achieved AAA and the other two achieved AA+. In addition, an intra-industrial comparison indicates 
that except for five cases in the automobile, electric appliance, iron and steel, and telecom, 
internationally listed companies typically achieved a higher or equal rating in comparison with their 
industrial peers which listed domestically.   
The above disparity is also reflected at the international level. The United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted three surveys in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively 
to review status of corporate governance disclosure. The survey at each time drew sample firms from 
the top ten largest enterprises within each region and chose a sample size of about 100. Three reviews 
consistently suggest that SOEs with only a domestic listing have a tendency towards lower rates of 
disclosure than those with an international listing, and that internationally listed SOEs tend to have 
rates of disclosure comparable to global best practice, while non-listed and only domestically-listed 
SOEs tend to be among those with the lowest rates of disclosure (UNCTAD, 2006).  
Taken together, the above evidence indicates that even in an economy with weak legal system 
and weak norms governing behavior of corporations and their insiders, individual corporations can 
take it upon themselves to achieve better governance practices and higher credit ratings, thereby 
reducing their costs of capital financing. Such a self-selection process may be regarded as problematic 
in a pure statistical sense; it however does represent a strategic move for innovative enterprises to 
distinguish themselves from their local peers and is consistent with the evolution of the Anglo-
American system.       
5. MARKET LEVEL IMPROVEMENTS 
While micro level evidence indicates that international listing has enabled firms to improve 
their benefits from financial globalization, less clear is how these benefits can induce market level 
improvements. At the outset, equity market liberalization has been limited and capital account 
transactions are tightly controlled. There also remain considerable social, economic and historical 
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obstacles at every level to better corporate practices. Prior to the 1990s, little market-based 
cooperation or oversight existed. However just as financial globalization has induced reform at the 
firm level, it has also injected an element of dynamism into domestic institutional reforms. Two 
developments related to international listing are important in this context. First, the migration of 
Chinese companies towards Hong Kong and New York has created a more competitive environment 
for listings and equity investments. Coffee (2002) differentiates these improvements, which he refers 
to as regulatory competition, from the type of firm bonding outlined in the previous two sections. 
Regulatory competition is driven by efforts to stem the migration of companies abroad and is 
characterized by the move towards higher standards in domestic markets. Secondly, the listing of firms 
abroad and their exposure to international standards has led to a demand for greater standardization in 
the domestic business environment. The appendix outlines the key events marking China’s regulatory 
evolution and market level improvements. The following two subsections provide a more detailed 
assessment.   
(a) Regulatory competition 
As noted earlier, the emergence of NYSE at the end of 19th century was underpinned by its 
ability to market itself as a listing destination for good quality shares. By offering shareholders strong 
protection, the NYSE became one of the words leading markets, stemming the migration of US firms 
to European financial centers. To this day the NYSE continues to be viewed as a guardian of investor 
interests. The migration of better governed enterprises to Hong Kong and other international financial 
markets presents China’s stock markets with a similar challenge. Xi (2006a) argue that one of the 
effects of economic globalization is that it has put the CSRC under competitive pressure to adopt 
higher standards of corporate governance. China’s response has been significant not just for the 
measures introduced but also to the extent that they have followed the US model of mandating 
corporate governance practices. 
China’s first securities legislation was introduced in 1999 and a code of corporate governance 
for listed companies followed in 2001. Both were essentially codes of best practice based on 
international practices. The Securities Act of 2005 went a step further by increasing the level of legal 
protection afforded to individual Chinese investors. It prohibits any publicity or leaking of information 
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before such information is announced, standardizes securities dealing and underwriting and penalizes 
issuers for use of funds in ways other than stated in their offering documents (Wu, 2006). It 
empowered investors to seek damages for losses incurred against insiders who trade on inside 
information (Xi, 2006b). However one of the most significant reforms was the mandatory requirement 
that at least one-third of the board be independent, and that listed companies create audit and 
remuneration committees, both of which would have a majority of independent directors (Xi, 2006a).  
In addition boards were required to have a supervisory board, similar to that of German corporations. 
Company Law was also reformed with a revised law coming into force in January 2006. This reduced 
the all powerful role of the chairman by providing that a director or manager may serve as the legal 
representative of the firm (Wu, 2006).  
Not only was the codification of board structure in law unprecedented, but it also signaled the 
clear intention of Chinese regulators to move towards a type of prudential market regulation typically 
associated with the US. China’s mandatory approach to board composition is somewhat similar to the 
rational followed in the US where the legislature has acted when the interests of investors and the 
integrity of markets are perceived to be at risk. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 mandated much 
corporate governance including the structure of boardroom committees (Roe, 2005). Although it is 
widely acknowledged that enforcement problems and the misalignment of incentives remain, financial 
globalization has undoubtedly induced regulatory competition in China even though many restrictions 
on capital flows remain. 
(b) Standardized regulation 
The second market level effect has been more subtle. Because of enforcement problems, 
codifying corporate governance requirements in law is likely to have limited effects in the short term. 
Indeed early utility regulation in the US emerged as a response to market developments, and a 
crystallization of public opinion against monopolists, rather than a legal abstraction (Dillon, 1925). 
Firms often demanded regulation as a means of avoiding competition (Demsetz, 1968). Ultimately to 
be successful, regulations need to be enforceable. The success of the “regulated monopolist” in the US 
was dependent on the establishment by the state, of a legal system and pricing structure that was 
supportive of innovation and competition (Bates, 1997). International listing has witnessed increased 
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efforts for improving regulatory cooperation between China and Hong Kong and has also seen 
enterprises demand a more standardized form of regulation.  
The first listings witnessed the signing of Memorandums of Understanding on regulatory 
cooperation between the HKSFC and CSRC and the requirement that Chinese listings abide by the 
rules of the Hong Kong stock exchange (Zhu, 2001). In practice cross-jurisdictional cases have 
typically proved problematic for regulators in Hong Kong, as mainland probes into officials tend to 
take months to complete, with political considerations carefully weighed against financial and legal 
implications.34 The recall to Beijing of Mr. Liu as head of the BOCHK in 2003 illustrates the practical 
limitations of financial globalization. Authorities in Hong Kong had no opportunity to investigate Mr. 
Liu’s actions. An official at the HKMA reported that he was as baffled as the public on Mr. Liu’s 
situation.35 These type of problems stem from fundamental differences between the two legal systems, 
particularly the difficulty of reconciling Hong Kong’s case law with China’s legal codes (Zhu, 2001).  
Yet these difficulties have also provided a platform for greater cross-jurisdictional cooperation. 
In April 2007, both the HKSFC and the CBRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the further 
enhancement of the regulatory co-operation. The purpose of this was to put in place a framework for 
the commencement of regulatory co-operation, mutual assistance and information sharing, to allow 
both authorities to promptly identify risks, and adopt regulatory measures to protect investors. 
It is also clear that the prospect of international listing offers firms, even in troubled sectors of 
the economy a powerful incentive to reform. In China’s state commercial banking sector the urgency 
of banking reform is well known, particularly in advance of the eventual opening of the China’s 
banking market to foreign competition. Under the transition there exist few constraints for limiting 
demand and few measures for making borrowers bear the full cost of investing inefficiently 
(McKinnon, 1991). According to the Governor of the PBOC, “only when agencies at the micro-level 
put in place risk control and capital constraint, could monetary policy transmission mechanism 
work”.36 In 2004 Vice-Premier Huang Ju emphasized the need to learn from international practices, to 
explore a route of supervision that complies with China’s real conditions and international norms.37 
Offering state banks the incentive of an international listing in return for reform is pushing even the 
most problematic state banks to improve financial performance.38  
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Being listed on international stock markets has also increased enterprise demands for more 
standardized regulatory pricing structures. In the telecoms sector, corporate executives are clearly 
aware of international investors demand for increased shareholder value. However, at provincial level, 
price regulation is weak and it is political benchmarks that matter. As a consequence local managers 
tend to discount prices to enhance political standing. In the oil sector, increasing oil imports meant that 
listed firms were often at a disadvantage, as changes in the international oil price were not reflected in 
the state price. Differentials between the state price and the international price of crude can hurt the 
profitability of state producers whose profit margins are increasingly determined by market prices. The 
state price is often more driven by political and social considerations than market fundamentals. This 
in turn creates regulatory risk for investors leading to a situation not unlike that faced by European 
investors in the US in the 19th century who financed large infrastructure projects with little expectation 
of a financial return.  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper set out to examine how international listing could serve the purpose of 
strengthening the benefits and the reducing risks associated with financial globalization for a 
developing economy like China. Departing from the conventional macro lens, it instead focused on the 
micro-level innovations that enable firms in developing economies to overcome institutional 
constraints to better governance practices. It described how micro-level innovations not only formed 
the basis for the evolution of the Anglo-American system of governance, but how they are being 
employed by China’s large enterprises. International listings have not only led to the transfer of better 
governance practices in China’s large SOEs but have also induced regulatory competition at the 
market level. The findings further confirm China’s incremental approach to development. Firms have 
benefited from the oversight of international capital markets, even though the capital controls and 
other barriers that shield domestic markets from the direct effects of financial globalization remain in 
place. Our findings are in line with those on internationally listed stocks of Central and Eastern 
European firms (Korczak and Bohl, 2005), cross-listed stocks of US and EU companies (Pagano et al. 
2002) and survey evidence from UNCTAD (2006). The policy implication is that just as providing 
technical assistance to developing economies often proves more fruitful than financial aid, promoting 
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the mechanisms that assist the transfer of skills and knowledge may improve the benefit-risk calculus 
of globalization at the firm level.  
There are also significant opportunity costs to international listings. Listing exposes 
management to a type of external monitoring that they would have had little previous experience. 
International IPOs do not necessarily lead to the type of performance improvements predicted by 
privatization theory. Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong also have lower valuations and are priced 
more closely with market fundamental than their Mainland counterparts. Yet, if anything, these costs 
underscore the significance of international listings and the role of international capital markets to 
China’s future integration into the world economy. Given the huge political dimension to China’s 
large enterprises, it is unlikely that these costs would be borne if the long term economic payoff was 
not significant.  
While the micro level approach generates insights into China’s rapid development in the 
absence of well-developed legal and financial systems, it should be regarded as complementary rather 
than substitutive to the macro-level approach as indicated in Figure 2. Although leading firms in 
developing economies can overcome institutional thresholds, secure access to international capital, 
and in doing so learn from international capital markets, it would be difficult for the majority of firms 
in the economy to fully utilize these benefits unless certain levels of thresholds associated with 
institutional quality and financial sector development can be attained. 
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Notes  
                                                 
1 A study by the McKinsey Global Institute (2006) pointed out that on average, shares listed both in Hong Kong 
and in Mainland China (A-shares) trade at a 50 percent premium on the Mainland. 
2 The bankruptcy of GITIC and the insolvency of Guangdong Enterprises are cases in point (Nolan, 2004: 49). 
3 For examples see Clay and Wright (2005), Glaeser et al (2004) and Pratt (1980).  
4Trading of Mainland Stocks and HSI Constituent Stocks in Hong Kong, the UK and US, Hong Kong Securities 
and Futures Commission (2005), Research Paper No. 25.
5 “Shanghai Land hit by new claim” SCMP, June 23rd 2003. 
6 “Avoid graft case, journalists told” SCMP, June 16th 2003. 
7 Similar comparative results hold for Shenzhen Stock Exchange, although not reported here. 
8 Interestingly Table 3 presents a more sanguine picture of long-term performance than that provided for A-
shares by Wang et al. (2004), who find more immediate worsening in financial performance of domestic listings.  
9 Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) find that much of the improvement in profitability occurs in the three years 
before the government reduces its shareholding indicating that preparation for privatisation may induce 
restructuring. 
10 Interview: Executive Director, Bank of China (Hong Kong), Hong Kong, July 20th 2004. 
11  Interview: Executive Director, Bank of China (Hong Kong), Hong Kong July 20th 2004. 
12 Interview: Executive Director, China Unicom, Hong Kong, July 26th 2004. 
13 Chen Ge, Deputy Director Sinopec quoted in Business Week, October 23rd 2000. 
14 “Investors to China: Open those Books” Business Week, October 23rd 2000.  
15 Interview: Board Representative, Sinopec Head Quarters, Beijing August 12th 2004.   
16 Interview HKEX, July 22nd 2004, and HKSFC, July 5th 2004.  Securities regulation in Hong Kong is likely to 
become more prudential to bring the Hong Kong into line with international practice. 
17 Interview with HKEx July 22nd 2004; HKSFC July 5th 2004. 
18 "Irregularity committed by BOC branch in New York", Peoples Daily, March 6th 2002. 
19 “Lender hit by new scandal” The Standard (HK) August 4th 2004.   
20 Interview: Executive Director, China Unicom, Hong Kong July 26th 2004. 
21 Despite the low level of technology, considerable effort was invested into research, as is evident by the 
publications on refining in Chinese Scientific Journals during the 1950s and 60s (Williams, 1975: 244). 
22 Interview: Board Representative, Sinopec Head Quarters, Beijing August 12th 2004.   
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23 Interview: Board Representative, Sinopec Head Quarters, Beijing August 12th 2004.   
24 “ABB investing US$100 million in China Sinopec Corp. IPO” ABB Press Release (Zurich), September 12th 
2000.   
25 Interview: Board Representative, Sinopec Head Quarters, Beijing August 12th 2004.   
26 “Exxon adds 500-outlet to deal to Sinopec stake,” FT, September 12th 2000.  
27 See “BOC and CCB overhaul top management” FT  July 28th 2004. 
28 “Chinese Lessons” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 12th 1993. 
29  Interview: Board Representative, Sinopec Head Quarters, Beijing, August 12th 2004.   
30  Interview: Board Representative, Sinopec Head Quarters, Beijing, August 12th 2004.   
31 Interview: Executive Director, Bank of China (Hong Kong), Hong Kong, July 20th 2004. 
32 BOC (HK) Press Release, August 16th 2004. 
33 Xinhua Financial Network (XFN) and Shanghai Far East Credit Rating Co. Ltd (Far East) started to rank 
credit risks of China’s listed companies in January 2002, named as the XFN-Far East China Credit Rating. The 
rating is based on international standards and pays a special attention to corporate governance concerns given the 
generally perceived poor standards of corporate governance in Chinese companies (XFN, 2002).   
34 See “HKMA widens the Net in BOC Probe” The Standard (HK), August 6th 2004. 
35 HKMA Deputy Chief Executive HKMA as reported in SCMP June 14th 2003. 
36 “Some Considerations in the Study of Monetary Policy Transmission” Zhou Xiaochuan Governor, People's 
Bank of China, May 12th 2004 
37 “Vice premier emphasizes introduction of best banking practice” Peoples Daily July 1st 2004. 
38 “China grants permission to solely owned banks to list after reformation” Peoples Daily, February 9th 2002.   
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Figure 1. Impact of financial globalization on developing countries: Recent revision on assessment 
framework 
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Figure 2: Impact of financial globalization on developing countries: A Firm Level Perspective on 
assessment framework 
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Figure 3: Price Earnings Rations of the Hang Seng, H-share & Shanghai A-share Indices 
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Source: HSI Services and China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
  
 
 
 
Table 1: Average Corporate Governance Scores of Asian Companies by Country 
 
 
Country 
 
Country 
score 
Average 
company 
score 
Average 
company 
scores 
Quartile 4 
Average 
company 
scores 
Quartile 1 
 
Difference 
(Q4-Q1) 
Singapore 7.5 61.1 70.6 49.9 20.7 
Hong Kong 6.7 64.2 75.2 52.1 23.1 
India  6.2 54.9 70.3 39.3 31 
Malaysia 6.0 62.5 75.4 48.9 26.5 
Korea 5.8 56.8 73.8 38.2 35.6 
Taiwan 5.5 54.9 68.4 40.8 27.6 
Thailand 5.3 62.0 73.2 48.8 24.4 
Philippines 5.0 56.3 80.4 20.2 60.2 
China  5.3 51.0 64.3 36.7 27.6 
Indonesia 5.3 44.3 59.6 30.9 28.7 
Source: Data from CLSA (2004: 130) 
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Table 2: Equity Funds Raised by Listing on Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 1993-2007 (HK$ million)a                            
Year No of IPOs Fund raised on 
IPOs 
Fund raised post 
IPOs 
Total fund raised 
1993  10 9,092.04 14128.71 23220.75
1994  14 11,421.18 11685.17 23106.35
1995   2 3,581.10 6083.86 9664.96
1996  12 10,261.46 16619.31 26880.77
1997  25 71,432.34 42636.69 114069.04
1998   3 2,214.74 18712.63 20927.37
1999   7 6,249.22 53191.82 59441.04
2000   5 95,847.15 249562.21 345409.36
2001   6 17,630.92 7518.44 25149.36
2002   5 37,824.16 31771.67 69595.83
2003  11 49,214.99 2522.19 51737.18
2004  12 54,565.38 31046.63 85612.01
2005  13 138,222.23 42846.02 181068.25
2006  19 292,790.48 61800.44 354590.92
2007b   8 52,687.69 43003.56 95691.25
Note:  a Including both H-share listing of enterprises incorporated in China and “red chips” listing of 
Chinese enterprises incorporated in Hong Kong. b Provisional figures up to August 2007.  
Source: China Dimension in Data and Statistics of Hong Kong Sock Exchange’s website, 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/. 
 
 
Table 3: A Summary of the Long-Term Profitability of H-shares  
   
Performance 
Proxy 
 Pre-IPO 
performance 
3 years post IPO 
performance  
5 years post IPO 
Performance 
Median  0.71 1.197 0.614 
Mean 
(Stan. Dev.) 
0.907 
(0.664) 
1.156 
(1.061) 
0.947 
(1.307) 
RNP 
Standardized 
to 1 in year of 
IPO n. 41 41 24 
Median  0.729 1.252 0.607 
Mean 
(Stan. Dev.) 
0.935 
(0.877) 
1.527 
(1.708) 
1.173 
(1.411) 
Real EBIT 
Standardized 
to 1 in year of 
IPO n. 38 38 21 
Median  0.160 0.143 0.099 
Mean 
(Stan. Dev.) 
0.238 
(0.260) 
0.237 
(0.255) 
0.214 
(0.279) 
EBIT/Sales 
n. 42 42 28 
Note: This table presents the median, mean, standard deviation and number sampled (n.) for Real Net 
Profits (RNP), average Real Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT), and EBIT/sales. The data was 
downloaded in July 2004.  The sample covers all H-shares with a minimum of three years post 
privatization data.   
Source: Taiwan Economic Journal database.
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Table 4: Credit Rating of China’s Listed Companies (on the main boards), August 2007 
 
 International Listed Companies Domestic Listed Companies 
Rating  No. of 
Companies 
As % of the rated 
companies 
No. of 
Companies 
As % of the rated 
companies 
AAA 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
    4  
    2 
    5 
    3 
 
 
      0 
      1 
      5 
      8 
 
Subtotal   14   38.9     14     8.5 
A+ 
A 
A- 
    5 
    1 
    2 
     10 
    10 
    13 
 
Subtotal     8   22.2     33   20.1 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
    4 
    2 
    3 
     15 
    25 
    20 
 
Subtotal      9   25.0     60   36.6 
< BBB-     5   13.9     57   34.8 
Total rated   36 100.0   164 100.0 
Total Listed 152  1434  
 
Source:  XFN-Far East China Credit Rating Table (www.xfn.com/creditrating/), accessed in July 2003, 
December 2006, September 2007. 
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Appendix: Key Events in Regulatory Evolution and Market Level Improvements 
Nov/26/1990  Shanghai Stock Exchange was established. 
Dec/01/1990  Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established. 
Oct/25/1992  State Council Securities Committee and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
were established. 
Jun/29/1993  Qingdao Brewery offered the first H shares listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
Feb/22/1994  Shenzhen Stock Exchange temporarily stopped issuing new shares. 
Jul/01/1994  Company Law of the People’s Republic of China took effect. 
Aug/01/1994  
 
CRSC announced that selected foreign investors may purchase A shares. IPOs were 
discontinued for the remainder of the year. 
May/22/1997  Chinese government placed restrictions on trading by state-owned companies. 
Jun/06/1997  People’s Bank of China (PBOC) placed restrictions on investments by banks in stocks. 
Jan/01/1998  “Listing Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange” and “Listing Rules of Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange” took effect. 
Nov/18/1998  China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was established. 
Dec/02/1998  The CSRC put restrictions on the issuance of “insider shares”. 
Dec/29/1998  Securities Law of the P. R. China was announced, to take effect July 1, 1999. 
Jun/03/1999  B shares were allowed to be issued by companies with all ownership structures. 
Oct/29/1999  Securities investment funds started to trade on the domestic inter-bank market. 
Nov/13/1999  Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market was established. 
Jan/06/2000  Brokers and funds were allowed to enter the domestic inter-bank market. 
Jun/13/2000  Number of registered investors in two domestic stock exchanges exceeded 50 million. 
Jul/06/2000  Number of domestically listed companies reached 1,000. 
Jan/04/2001  Chinese companies raised more than RMB 100 trillion on the Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hong 
Kong stock exchanges. 
Feb/19/2001  Domestic residents may hold B shares. 
Apr/23/2001  PT Shuixian, an appliances company, became the first delisted company in China. 
Sep/04/2001 The first open-end fund, Hua’an Chuangxin, was issued. 
Dec/01/2001 “New Trading Rules for Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges” took effect. 
Dec/11/2001 China gained accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Jan/07/2002 “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China” was jointly issued by CSRC 
and State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). 
Nov/4/2002 Foreign investors were permitted to purchase state-owned shares and legal person shares. 
Dec/01/2002 Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) regulation came into effect. 
Dec/20/2002 
 
The first joint-venture securities firm and first joint-venture fund management company were 
established. 
Feb/28/2003 The CSRC approved the first five QFII custodians’ qualifications. 
Apr/09/2003 The first tender offer is made in China. 
Apr/28/2003 The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is established. 
Jul/10/2003 The Union Bank of Switzerland becomes the first QFII to invest in A shares. 
May/27/2004 First trading day of Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s Small and Medium Enterprise Board. 
Aug/31/2004 CSRC stopped the issuance of new shares in order to implement non-tradable share reforms. 
Nov/29/2004 
 
“Guidelines for Listed Stocks (Amendment)” issued by Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. 
Feb/24/2005 First exchange-traded fund was listed. 
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Apr/30/2005 Reform of non-tradable shares began in selected companies. 
Jul/21/2005 RMB was revalued by 2%. China adopted a managed float against a basket of currencies. 
Nov/22/2005 Reform of non-tradable shares was completed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board. 
Jan/01/2006 Revised Securities Law and Companies Law took effect. 
Jan/05/2006 G-share (of companies that have completed non-tradable share reform) index was launched 
and foreign investors may invest in G shares and newly listed companies. 
Mar/07/2006 The Swiss cement producer Holchin B.V. became G share’s first foreign institutional 
investor. 
Mar/21/2006 “Guidance on Articles of Association of Listed Companies” became effective. 
May/08/2006 “Administrative Rules for Securities Offerings of Listed Companies” became effective. 
May/15/2006 New trading rules adopted by Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
May/18/2006 “Measures for the Administration of Initial Public Offerings and Listing of Stocks” took 
effect. 
Jun/01/2006 
 
Bank of China (BOC) has its first trading day on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The BOC 
IPO raises $11.2 billion. 
Jul/05/2006 
 
Bank of China’s first trading day on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. BOC raises RMB 20 
billion in its Shanghai IPO. 
Oct/27/2006 The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China raises a combined $21.9 billion in Hong Kong 
and Shanghai IPO. 
Jan/31/2007 “Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies” took 
effect. 
Source: CSRC website at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n575727/index.html. Xinhua Finance and 
Milken Institute (Nov. 2006), “Chinese Initial Public Offering: Background Brief,” available at 
www.milkeninstitute.org/chinaindicators/pdfs/InitialPubOffer.pdf. Lin et al. (2007), “The 
Development of Corporate Governance in China”, Company Lawyer, Vol. 28(7), pp. 195-203. 
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